Abstract Consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) over a distributed storage system where M records are stored across N servers by using an [N, K] MDS code. For simplicity, this problem is usually referred as the coded PIR problem. In 2016, Banawan and Ulukus designed the first capacityachieving coded PIR scheme with sub-packetization KN M and access number M KN M , where capacity characterizes the minimal download size for retrieving per unit of data, and sub-packetization and access number are two metrics closely related to implementation complexity. In this paper, we focus on minimizing the sub-packetization and the access number for linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. We first determine the lower bounds on sub-packetization and access number, which are Kn M −1 and M Kn M −1 , respectively, in the nontrivial cases (i.e., N > K 1 and M > 1), where n = N/gcd(N, K). We then design a general linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme to simultaneously attain these two bounds, implying tightness of both bounds.
Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) is a canonical problem in the study of privacy issues that arise from the retrieval of information from public databases. Specifically, PIR involves a database that contains M records and a user's with query interest θ ∈ {1, . . . , M }. The goal is to make the user get retrieves the θ-th record without revealing the index θ. In the information theoretic sense, the PIR problem can only be solved trivially solved by downloading all M records if the database is stored in one server. Therefore, in FOCS'95 Chor et al. [1, 2] developed the distributed formulation for of PIR, where the database is stored across N servers and the user can communicate with all N servers. The privacy requirement is to ensure the secrecy of θ against any individual server. Since then, PIR has become a central research topic in the computer science literature, see [3] for a survey on PIR.
A central issue in PIR is minimizing the communication cost, which is usually measured by the total number of bits transferred from the user to the servers (i.e., the upload size) and from the servers to −1 . In [7] , they derived the capacity for the colluding case (i.e., ensuring the secrecy of the retrieval index θ against any subset containing at most T colluding servers for 1 T < N ) and the robust case (i.e., some servers may fail to respond). They also determined the capacity of PIR with symmetric privacy in [8] , where symmetric privacy means that the user is required to get no information about the record other than the θ-th record. Banawan and Ulukus [9] recently derived the capacity of a multi-message PIR with replicated non-colluding servers for the case of retrieving more than half records. In [10] , they studied the capacity of PIR with colluding and Byzantine servers. Other studies considered the PIR problem when some side information is available to the user [11] [12] [13] [14] .
• Coded PIR. In this case, the database is stored across N servers using some code. In particular, an [N, K] maximum distance separable (MDS) code is mostly used. Banawan and Ulukus [15] proved that the capacity of the PIR problem with MDS coded non-colluding servers (i.e., coded PIR) is ( 
In [16] , the authors designed a scheme for MDS coded non-colluding servers with rate 1 − K N . The capacity of PIR with symmetric privacy based on MDS coded non-colluding servers was derived in [17] . In [18] , the authors presented a framework for PIR from Reed-Solomon coded colluding servers, and designed a scheme with the rate 1 − K+T −1 N . Another PIR scheme for MDS coded colluding servers was later presented in [19] with the rate ( Determining PIR capacity is usually accomplished from two sides: proving an upper bound on the capacity and designing a general PIR scheme with rate attaining the upper bound. Therefore, these schemes are called capacity-achieving PIR schemes. Almost all existing capacity-achieving PIR schemes are implemented by dividing each record into sub-packets (say, L sub-packets) and querying some linear combinations of the sub-packets from each server. We call L as the sub-packetization of the scheme and call the total number of sub-packets accessed by all N servers as the access number. Although large sub-packetization helps to improve the PIR rate, it also increases complexity in implementation because larger sub-packetization means more combinations, and thus therefore more multiplications are involved. The problems of reducing sub-packetization and the access-optimal property have been studied in depth in the literature of minimum storage regenerating codes [20, 21] . However, for the PIR problem, most known capacity-achieving PIR schemes with asymmetric privacy have exponential sub-packetization and access number. For example, the capacity-achieving scheme in [6] exhibits sub-packetization N M and access number M N M , and the scheme in [15] has sub-packetization KN M and access number M KN M . On the other hand, a scheme with sub-packetization K(N − K) was designed in [16] at the cost of failing to achieve the capacity. Theoretically, it is meaningful to characterize the minimum sub-packetization for achieving capacity in linear PIR schemes.
Our research interest is to minimize both the sub-packetization and the access number for linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes. For replication-based PIR, Ref. [22] first characterized the optimal download cost for arbitrary record length and demonstrated that the optimal sub-packetization for T = 1 is N M−1 . One of our recent work [23] extends this result to general T and proves that the optimal subpacketization for capacity-achieving PIR schemes over replicated servers is dn M−1 , where d = gcd(N, T ), n = N/d. In this paper, we focus on the sub-packetization and the access number for linear capacityachieving PIR schemes over MDS coded non-colluding servers. Our contributions are three-fold. (1) A lower bound on the sub-packetization L, i.e., L Kn M−1 , where n = N/gcd(N, K). (2) A lower bound on the access number ω, i.e., ω M Kn M−1 . (3) A general linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme with sub-packetization L = Kn M−1 and access number ω = M Kn M−1 , which implies that our lower bounds are both tight. In other words, we design a capacity-achieving PIR scheme that simultaneously achieves the optimal sub-packetization and the optimal access number.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, a formal description of the coded PIR model and a brief recall of the proof for capacity are provided in Section 2. Lower bounds on the sub-packetization and the access number are then presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, a general linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme that simultaneously attains the two lower bounds is presented in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Notations and the PIR model
For positive integers m, n ∈ N with m < n, we denote by [m : n] the set {m, m + 1, . . . , n} and denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) and any subset Γ = {i 1 , . . . , i m } ⊆ [n], let Q Γ = (q i1 , . . . , q im ). Moreover, to differentiate indices of the servers for records, we use superscripts as indices of the servers and subscripts for the records. For example, we use Q (i) θ to denote the a query to the i-th server when the user wants the θ-th record. Throughout the paper, we use cursive capital letters to denote random variables such as W, Q.
Suppose there are M records denoted by W 1 , . . . , W M . Each record consists of L symbols drawn independently and uniformly from the finite field F q , i.e.,
where H(·) denotes the entropy function with base q. Moreover, the M records are stored across N servers through an [N, K] MDS code. Therefore, we further assume L = KL and
be a generator matrix of an [N, K] MDS code over F q . Then following MDS encoding, the i-th server, Serv
where
A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve a record, say W θ , for some θ ∈ [M ] by accessing the N servers while ensuring the secrecy of the index θ against any individual server. PIR consists of two phases.
• Query phase. Given an index θ ∈ [M ] and some random resources S, the user computes Que(θ, S) = (Q Note that S and θ are private information only known to the user, and the function Que(·, ·) is the query function determined by the scheme. For simplicity, we define the query set Q = {Q
which implies that the user generates queries without knowledge of the exact content of the coded records.
• Response phase. For 1 i N , the i-th
θ and sends it to the user, where Ans (i) (·, ·) is Serv (i) 's answer function determined by the scheme.
Moreover, a coded PIR scheme must satisfy the following two conditions. (1) Correctness.
which implies that the user can definitely recover the record W θ after receiving responses from all servers. Based on the definition of Q, the correctness conditions can also be represented as
which implies that any individual server gets no information about the index θ. Note that Q
is the information held by the Serv (i) .
, which actually denotes the download size. From the privacy condition, we have I(θ; A (i) θ ) = 0, which implies that D is independent of the index θ. Thus, we can define the rate and the capacity of PIR schemes as follows.
Definition 1 (PIR rate and capacity). The PIR rate R of a PIR scheme is defined as
The capacity C C-PIR is the supremum of R over all PIR schemes.
Definition 2 (Sub-packetization and access number). Suppose L = KL and each record is expressed as a K ×L matrix over F q , i.e., W j ∈ F K×L q for 1 j M . Using the notations defined previously, a coded PIR scheme is called linear if for retrieving any record W θ , θ ∈ [M ], the answers from each server are derived as linear combinations of the data stored in that server, i.e., for 1 i N ,
We call L as the sub-packetization of the PIR scheme. Moreover, we define the access number ω as the maximum number of sub-packets accessed by all servers for retrieving any record, i.e., ω = max
where RN(Q
Capacity of coded PIR schemes
Note that the capacity of coded PIR has been determined in [15] , i.e., C C-PIR = (1+
We briefly restate some key lemmas during the derivation of this capacity, which will be used in later sections. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 can be found in [15] .
Lemma 2. For a coded PIR scheme, for any θ
Note that from (9) and (10) we can immediately determine that for any θ, θ
Lemma 3. For a coded PIR scheme, for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ], for any θ ∈ Λ and any θ
for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, then
where (a) follows from (11), the inequality (b) comes from the Han's inequality, (c) is due to the fact that
θ ′ , W Λ , Q) = 0, and (d) comes from the assumptions (1) and (2). The next theorem characterizes the capacity of [N, K] MDS coded PIR in the non-colluding case (i.e., T = 1). The theorem has been proved in [15] . Here, we reprove the theorem to derive some key equalities for later use. Theorem 1. For coded PIR with M records and N coded servers, the capacity is
Proof.
Based on the general capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme presented in [15] , it is sufficient to demonstrate that for all coded PIR schemes, the PIR rate is bounded by R (1+
For any θ ∈ [M ], we prove
First, we have
where (a) comes from (2) and (5). Then by Lemma 3, H(A
. By recursively using Lemma 3, we have
where (a) comes from (3). Combining with (14) and (15), we immediately obtain (13). Finally, for any coded PIR scheme, we know that its rate
Combining with (13) ,
3 The lower bound on sub-packetization
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. Namely,
In proving the lower bound, we derive some identities of capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes and then some properties of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Finally, the proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Subsection 3.3.
Some identities for capacity-achieving PIR schemes Lemma 4. Consider capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. For any
Proof.
for any coded PIR scheme.
In particular, for every capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme, R = (1 +
θ ) = D for capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. Combining with (14) and (17), we further have 
Proof. For capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes, (12) and (13) both hold with equalities, i.e., for any
while for any θ ∈ Λ,
θ ′ |W Λ , Q). Thus we are left to prove Lemma 5 for the case θ ∈ Λ. Arbitrarily choose θ ′ ∈ Λ, then for any θ ∈ Λ,
where (a) comes from (21) and (b) comes from (11). 
Properties of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes
We first define a vectorization operator Vec, which maps a matrix A ∈ F m×n to a row vector Vec(A) ∈ F mn whose entries are successively drawn from the matrix row by row. For example, suppose A = 1 2 0 2 0 1 , then Vec(A) = (1 2 0 2 0 1) . The proof of Proposition 1 is not difficult and so we omit it here.
By Proposition 1, we can rewrite (7), i.e., A
That is, we formulate a general linear coded PIR scheme in (22) . In particular, we represent each record as a row vector by using the function Vec, which is convenient for investigating the rank of the matrix. For any
Next, we establish a connection between the rank of the sub-matrixQ Γ θ,Λ and some conditional entropy in Lemma 6. Combining with the identities of the entropy obtained in Subsection 3.1, we can then get some characterizations of these sub-matrices in Proposition 2, which will be used to prove the lower bound on sub-packetization in Subsection 3.3. 
The proof of Lemma 6 is similar to that of Lemma 8 in [23] and is omitted here.
Proposition 2. For a linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], then it holds
Moreover, for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, it holds
Proof. First, it follows from (23) and (19) that rank(Q 
Proof of Theorem 2
We first present a simple lemma without proof. (1) Prove L and D have specific forms, that is, By the definition of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes, we have
Since both L and D are integers in linear schemes, then (27) implies n M−1 |L
Note that gcd(n, k) = 1, and so by Lemma 7 it holds gcd n M−1 ,
On the other hand, by the assumption of L i.e., L = KL, which implies that L is a multiple of lcm(K,
Combining with (27), Combining with (26), one can obtain rank(Q
Note that gcd(n, k) = 1, then we know from Lemma 7 that gcd(n M−2 ,
The lower bound on access number
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the access number for all linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. Namely, 
Proof.
Note that in the second part of the proof of Theorem 2, it holds rank(Q
. Combining with (9) and (23), one can obtain rank(Q
, where (a) follows from Theorem 2. In this section, we present a linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme with the sub-packetization L = Kn M−1 and the access number ω = M Kn M−1 for nontrivial cases, i.e., N > K 1, M > 1. To illustrate the main idea, we begin with three examples. The first two examples are for the case K < N < 2K and the third is for the case N 2K.
Examples
Example 1. Suppose M = 2, N = 3 and K = 2. In this case the sub-packetization of our scheme is L = Kn M−1 = 6, and so each record can be regarded as a 2 × 3 matrix over F q , i.e., W 1 , W 2 ∈ F 2×3 q . Let g i be the i-th column of a 2 × 3 generator matrix G of an [3, 2] MDS code over F q , which is used for distributed storage. That is, the data stored in Serv
. Without loss of generality, suppose the the user wants W 1 . The PIR scheme works as follows.
First, let S 1 , S 2 be two matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 3 × 3 permutation matrices, where a permutation matrix is a binary matrix with only one 1 in each row and each column. Define (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 We display all the answers in Figure 1(a) . Specifically, these answers are formed by iteratively applying the following two steps:
(a1) Combining new desired columns with recoverable interference columns; (a2) Querying new interference columns to enforce record symmetry within each server. As in Figure 1(a) , the second line is built based on the first line by using (a2). Thus, the record symmetry is achieved within each server in the first two lines. For example, Serv (1) provides two symbols related with each record, while Serv (2) and Serv (3) each provides one symbol related with each record.
After the two lines, one can see that the columns a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 are recoverable from the [3, 2] MDS encoding. Then, using (a1), the third line of the table is formed. It is clear that the user can recover all the columns a 1 , a 2 , a 3 from all the answers listed in the table. By multiplying S −1 1 the user can then obtain the record W 1 . Thus, the correctness condition is satisfied. We then explain why the privacy condition also holds. It is equivalent to show that for any individual server, its query sequence for retrieving W 1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving W 2 . The answers for retrieving W 2 are listed in Figure 1(b) , where the columns a
. and the matrices S ′ 1 and S ′ 2 are random permutation matrices. For any individual server, say Serv (2) , and any random permutation matrices S 1 , S 2 , we show that there exist corresponding choices of S ′ 1 , S ′ 2 such that the answers of Serv (2) remain the same in both tables in Figure 1 . Specifically, set S
, where s i,j denotes the j-th column of S i for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3. Then (a 1 , b 1 , a 3 
, which implies that the query sequence for retrieving W 1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving W 2 for the server Serv (2) . Similarly, one can find the corresponding permutation matrices S ′ 1 , S ′ 2 for any individual server. Since the permutation matrices are randomly chosen and privately known by the user, the privacy condition is satisfied. Figure 2 Query sequence for θ = 1 in the (M = 3, N = 3, K = 2) PIR scheme.
Serv
Serv (2) Serv (3) Serv (4) Serv (5) (a2) (a1) The total number of downloaded symbols from all servers is 4 + 3 + 3 = 10 and each record consists of 6 symbols. Hence, the PIR rate is , which is a generator matrix of an [3, 2] MDS storage code. WLOG, suppose the desired record is W 1 .
First, define a [1:9] [1:9] = W 3 S 3 , where S 1 , S 2 , S 3 are privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 9 × 9 permutation matrices. The user then iteratively applies steps (a1) and (a2) to generate the queries for all servers, which is displayed in Figure 2 . For simplicity, from now on we use the notation a i to denote g The correctness condition and the privacy condition can be similarly verified as in Example 1. The access number of this scheme is 54, and the PIR rate of this scheme is , which is a generator matrix of an [5, 2] MDS code used for distributed storage. Then the data stored in Serv
. WLOG, assume the desired record is W 1 . Let S 1 , S 2 be two binary matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 5 × 5 permutation matrices. Then define a [1:5] 
Then the queries to all servers are displayed in Figure 3 .
The correctness condition and the privacy condition can be similarly verified as in Example 1. The access number of this scheme is 20, and the PIR rate of this scheme is 
The h-th Λ-type |Λ|-sum provided by Serv (i)
The number of each type of j-sums provided by Serv (i) 
Formal description of the general scheme
In addition to the notations defined in Section 2, a formal description of our general scheme requires some additional notations that are listed in Table 1 for a quick check. As in the examples, the user first privately selects binary matrices S 1 , . . . , S M independently and uniformly from allL ×L binary permutation matrices. Define
. Evidently, q Λ,λ is a desired column for Λ = {θ}, an interference column for θ / ∈ Λ, and a mixed column for {θ} Λ.
As illustrated in Example 1, the answers given by each server are generated as sums of the three kinds of columns. Because of the record symmetry enforced by applying (a2) throughout the scheme, for any Serv 
The key idea in minimizing the sub-packetization in this work is that we abandon the symmetry across all servers enforced in [15] and instead adapt partial symmetry among the servers. Specifically, we divide the N servers into two groups, the first N −K servers in one group and the remaining N −K servers in the other. We then only enforce the symmetry across the servers within each group. Consequently, we further define notations α j and β j such that α j γ Therefore, a general description of the query sequences can be displayed in Table 2 , where q (b1) The Λ-type parts all come from the Λ-type sums provided by the servers; (b2) For each Serv (i) , i ∈ [N ], its Λ-type sums and the Λ-type parts in all its Λ-types sums are distinct.
For example, in Example 2 where θ = 1, let Λ = {2}, then the result of Dist 1 ({2}, {1, 2}) is displayed in Figure 4 (a). One can observe that b 3 , b 4 are exactly the {2}-type parts of Serv (1) 's {1, 2}-types sums because it provides the {1, 2}-types sums a 5 + b 3 , a 6 + b 4 as shown in Figure 2 . In addition, one can verify that Dist 1 ({2}, {1, 2}) satisfies the rule (b1) and (b2). |Γ| Λ-type parts each of which is allocated to a Γ-type sums; (b4) Each Λ-type part appears in K different servers. For example, for the case θ=1 in the Example 2, the results of Dist 2 ({1}, {1, 2}) and Dist 2 ({2, 3}, {2, 3}) are displayed in Figure 4 (b) and (c), respectively. By repeatedly invoking the functions Dist 1 (·, ·) and Dist 2 (·, ·), Algorithm 1 generates all queries to each server.
